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THE ORIGIN AND REGULATION OF HEALTH RISKt 
Carcinogen Regulation: Risk Characteristics 
and the Synthetic Risk Bias 
By W. KIP Viscusi* 
Why does the government regulate dif- 
ferent kinds of risks? Economists usually 
trace the motivation for the regulation to 
the existence of some form of market fail- 
ure. In such instances, it will be desirable to 
regulate substances for which the benefits 
of the regulation exceed the costs, which 
will potentially be the case if there is some 
inadequacy in the market. 
The restrictive legislative mandates of 
regulatory agencies in some cases prohibit 
basing regulations on a balancing of benefits 
and costs, and at the very least, seldom 
encourage such balancing.1 As a result, one 
would expect the benefits of regulatory ef- 
forts to play a greater role in regulatory 
decisions than do the costs.2 This pattern is 
exemplified by the high implicit values per 
statistical life that have been observed for 
U.S. regulatory efforts.3 Regulatory agen- 
cies consequently tend to be risk-oriented in 
their policy approach. 
What this characterization eglects is that, 
even within the context of emphasizing risks, 
regulatory agencies may not be making bal- 
anced decisions. The risk level consists of 
two principal components, the probability of 
an adverse outcome and the number of peo- 
ple affected. The probability depends on the 
potency of the exposure, the frequency of 
the exposure, and similar kinds of parame- 
ters. Regulatory agencies are generally con- 
cerned with the risk, particularly with re- 
spect to the potency of the chemicals. In 
contrast, the number of people exposed to 
the risk plays a much less prominent role in 
regulatory decisions. The standard regula- 
tory policy trigger is typically linked to a 
probability of an adverse outcome as op- 
posed to an expected body count. 
The U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency Superfund program is a case in 
point. In that effort, the focus is on the risks 
posed by different pathways by which popu- 
lations could be exposed to the hazard. In 
the course of the detailed policy analysis 
prepared for each Superfund site, EPA 
never assesses the size of the population 
exposed to the risk. Moreover, there is not 
even an assessment of the probability that a 
future population will be exposed to the 
risk. The presence of a risk with a potential 
exposure to a future population is sufficient 
to trigger government action. 
Extrapolation from this experience to 
other instances would lead one to expect 
that the probability of cancer or some other 
adverse health outcome would be the driv- 
ing force behind regulatory decisions. How- 
ever, even this characterization may be 
overly broad. In this paper, I will explore 
the decision to regulate natural and syn- 
thetic chemicals. To what extent are regula- 
tory decisions driven by the severity of the 
risk as opposed to the character of the risk 
exposure? The striking result is that the 
risk severity Dlavs a very small role. Instead. 
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Kenkel, Pennsylvania State University; Tyler Cowen, 
George Mason University. 
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it is whether the chemical is synthetic or 
natural that is the driving force behind reg- 
ulatory decisions. 
I. The Carcinogen Sample 
The results here will focus on a sample of 
widely publicized carcinogens developed by 
Bruce N. Ames and discussed in Ames et al. 
(1990) and in Lois Gold et al. (1992). These 
results are similar to those obtained for a 
much larger sample of several hundred 
chemicals in a study by the author. 
The particular chemical sample that will 
be analyzed consists of 51 different chemi- 
cals that appear in 80 potential sources, 
which I will designate as the Ames 51 and 
Ames 80 samples. Many of the potential 
chemical exposures are to common natural 
products, such as lettuce, basil, brown mus- 
tard, celery, and coffee. In addition, there 
are exposure to other chemicals such as 
Captan, Lindane, and DDT. The chemicals 
may appear more than one time in the 
listing because they may occur in multiple 
products. For example, caffeic acid is a car- 
cinogen contained in lettuce, apples, pears, 
coffee, plums, celery, carrots, and potatoes. 
For each of these chemicals, Ames 
developed indexes of the carcinogenicity of 
the chemical. The primary risk measure 
of the hazard, which reflects the potency of 
the chemical as well as the amount of the 
daily human exposure, is the human 
exposure/rodent potency index (HERP). 
For the chemical group, the highest possible 
HERP index is 140 for exposures to EDB, 
with the lowest being 6xl -O9 for Captan. 
Ames has also developed a carcinogenic 
potency data base to capture the riskiness 
of carcinogens independent of the extent of 
human exposure. The two measures that 
will be analyzed in this paper are the TD50 
values for rats and mice. The TD50 value is 
the chronic dose (in mg/kg-day) of the 
chemical which causes half of the rats (mice) 
in the sample to develop tumors over the 
course of a lifetime. Chemicals with higher 
TD50 values are consequently safer than 
those with lower values. The HERP value 
calculated for each exposure has been ob- 
tained using the more sensitive of the two 
species to calculate the possible risk implied 
by the chemical exposure. Other risk mea- 
sures, such as the EPA IRIS data-base slope 
factors, generate similar results. 
The other principal characteristic of 
chemicals that will be assessed is the extent 
to which chemicals that are synthetic (0-1 
dummy variable) are regulated more or less 
stringently than those that are not. Syn- 
thetic chemicals are subject to the Delaney 
Clause in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act, so that one would expect synthetic food 
additives to be subject to more stringent 
regulation. However, the pattern for syn- 
thetic chemicals proves to be quite general 
and is apparent across different agencies as 
well. If agencies are truly concerned with 
the actual risks posed by the chemicals, they 
should not be concerned with their syn- 
thetic nature, but instead should focus on 
the magnitude of the risk based on the 
HERP index or some other measure of po- 
tency. An alternative possibility is that it is 
not simply the magnitude of the risk that is 
consequential, but also the character of the 
risk. The general public, for example, greatly 
overestimates novel risks such as those asso- 
ciated with synthetic chemicals. To the ex- 
tent that regulatory agencies are reflective 
of public preferences, one would expect 
there to be more stringent regulation of 
synthetic chemicals. 
II. Patterns of Regulation 
Table 1 summarizes the different patterns 
of regulation. For the Ames 51 sample, 35 
of the chemical exposures are regulated, 
and 16 are not. For the Ames 80 sample, 49 
exposures are regulated, and 31 are not. 
Thus, in each case the sample comprises a 
very large number of regulated chemicals. 
Table 1 presents information for these 
chemicals based on all regulations of the 
chemicals as well as those subject to FDA 
regulation. In each case, panels A and B of 
Table 1 provide information, by regulatory 
status of the chemicals, on the average per- 
centage of chemicals that are synthetic and 
the risks associated with them. It is particu- 
larly striking that the regulated chemicals 
are disproportionately synthetic. In the 
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TABLE 1-SUMMARY OF KEY RISK MEASURES, 
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
(IN PARENTHESES) 
Variable Unregulated Regulated 
A. Ames 51 
All regulations: 
Synthetic 0.13 0.63 
(0.34) (0.49) 
ln (HERP index) -4.54 - 6.42 
(5.26) (6.07) 
FDA regulations: 
Synthetic 0.29 0.88 
(0.46) (0.34) 
ln (HERP index) -4.73 - 8.24 
(4.32) (7.90) 
B. Ames 80 
All regulations: 
Synthetic 0.06 0.59 
(0.25) (0.50) 
ln(HERP index) -4.94 - 6.32 
(4.70) (5.50) 
FDA regulations: 
Synthetic 0.17 0.77 
(0.38) (0.44) 
ln(HERP index) - 5.70 - 7.60 
(3.96) (8.02) 
Variable Nonsynthetic Synthetic 
C. Ames 51 
All regulations: 
Regulated 0.48 0.92 
(0.51) (0.28) 
ln (HERP index) -5.11 -6.64 
(4.05) (7.37) 
FDA regulations: 
Regulated 0.07 0.58 
(0.27) (0.50) 
ln(HERP index) -5.11 - 6.64 
(4.05) (7.37) 
D. Ames 80 
All regulations: 
Regulated 0.41 0.94 
(0.50) (0.25) 
ln(HERP index) - 5.36 - 6.45 
(4.05) (6.69) 
FDA regulations: 
Regulated 0.08 0.59 
(0.28) (0.50) 
ln(HERP index) - 5.36 - 7.93 
(4.05) (6.97) 
Ames 51 sample, 63 percent of the regu- 
lated chemicals are synthetic, and 13 per- 
cent of the unregulated chemicals are syn- 
thetic. Similar patterns are displayed in the 
Ames 80 group as well. A similar synthetic 
emphasis with an even higher percentage of 
regulated chemicals being synthetic is cap- 
tured in the FDA regulation group. 
Whereas the synthetic status of the chem- 
ical plays a pivotal role in determining regu- 
latory decisions, the risk level does not. The 
natural log of the HERP index is the mea- 
sure of the risk level that is used. Because 
of the role of very high risk outliers, particu- 
larly EDB exposures which have a HERP 
value almost an order of magnitude larger 
than the second-largest chemical exposure 
examined, the natural logarithm of the risk 
is used to capture the risk level. Somewhat 
strikingly, from both the Ames 51 and 
Ames 80 group and for Federal regulations 
overall and FDA regulations, the ln(HERP 
index) has a lower value for the regulated 
chemicals than for unregulated chemicals. 
In terms of the risk level, the regulated 
chemicals pose a somewhat lower risk using 
this index, whereas they differ considerably 
in terms of their synthetic character, as they 
are disproportionately synthetic. 
The breakdown in panels C and D of 
Table 1 provides an even more striking con- 
trast. For the Ames 51 sample, 24 of the 
51 chemicals are synthetic, and for the 
Ames 80 sample, 31 of the 80 chemicals are 
synthetic. In each instance, over 90 percent 
of the synthetic chemicals are the subject of 
federal regulation, as compared with under 
half of the nonsynthetic. Moreover, the risks 
posed by synthetic chemicals as measured 
by the ln(HERP index) are lower for the 
synthetic chemicals than for the non- 
synthetic chemicals. Similar contrast is evi- 
dent in the case of FDA regulations, which 
capture a smaller segment of the chemical 
group but for which there is an even greater 
relative contrast between the synthetic and 
nonsynthetic chemicals in terms of the 
probability of regulation. As in the case of 
all chemicals, the risk levels posed by the 
synthetic chemicals are a bit less than for 
those that are not synthetic. 
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TABLE 2-LOGIT ESTIMATES OF REGULATION 
PROBABILITIES, COEFFICIENTS 
(ASYMPTOTIC STANDARD ERROR) 
A. Ames 51 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Synthetic 2.8* 2.8* 3.1* 
(1.1) (1.1) (1.2) 
HERP index 0.005 
(0.053) 
Mice die -1.4 
(1.2) 
Rats TD50 2.1 x 10-4 
(3.6 x 10-4) 
Mice TD50 1.2 x 10-4 
(1.2x 10-4) 
B. Ames 80 
Variable (4) (5) (6) 
Synthetic 3.3* 3.5* 3.5* 
(1.1) (1.1) (1.1) 
HERP index 9.9x 10-3 
(79.1 x 10-3) 
Mice die -0.4 
(0.8) 
Rats TD50 - 3.6 x 10-4 
(3.9x 10-4) 
Mice TD50 - 0.6 x 10-4 
(1.2x 10-4) 
Notes: All equations include an intercept and a dummy 
variable for whether rat and mice were tested; equa- 
tions (1) and (4) include a dummy variable for whether 
the rat tests were fatal. The standard errors of these 
variables are all larger than the estimated coefficients. 
*Coefficients are statistically significant at the 95- 
percent confidence level, two tailed test. 
These results also are borne out in more 
detailed logit regression results to assess the 
determinants of the probability of govern- 
ment regulation. Each equation includes 
characterizations of the synthetic character 
of the risk and a measure of the risk 
level-either the HERP index or the TD50 
values for rats and mice. Sensitivity analyses 
with a wide variety of risk measures and 
functional forms for these risk measures 
yielded similar results. Moreover, these re- 
gressions also control for the presence of 
test information with respect to the differ- 
ent chemicals. 
The principal pattern characterized by the 
results in Table 2 is that the synthetic char- 
acter of the risk is a driving force behind 
the probability of regulation, controlling for 
the risk level. Although the results differ 
somewhat across specifications, overall the 
synthetic character of the chemical for this 
sample increases the probability of regula- 
tion by an average of about one-third. One 
would expect for a sample of much less 
potent carcinogens that this influence would 
be less. It is also striking that none of the 
other risk measures included in the equa- 
tion is ever statistically significant at the 
usual confidence levels. For the range of 
variation of riskiness reflected in this sam- 
ple, it is not the risk posed by the chemicals, 
but rather the character of the risk that 
seems to be most instrumental in driving 
federal regulatory decisions. 
III. Explaining Regulatory Patterns 
Once government agencies depart from a 
framework in which the total net benefits of 
regulations become a matter of concern, 
there is no assurance that the overall risk 
effects will be captured in the decisions. 
Agency practices suggest that there is un- 
due emphasis on the probabilities involved 
rather than the populations exposed. 
What this examination of carcinogen reg- 
ulation indicates is that the character of the 
risks is instrumental as well. For the chemi- 
cal groups considered, it is not the magni- 
tude of the risk, but rather the synthetic 
nature of the risks that drives the regulatory 
decision. This type of bias by government 
agencies appears to be reflective of a similar 
irrationality on the part of individual deci- 
sions. 
One of the principal anomalies that has 
been documented in the risk-perception and 
choice-under-uncertainty literature is that 
individuals tend to overreact to increases 
in the risk level. In Viscusi et al. (1987), 
we termed this a "reference risk" effect 
whereby changes in the risk level from 
the accustomed risk will lead to an exag- 
gerated response in terms of the implicit 
risk-dollar trade-off reflected in individual 
decisions. Focusing on a similar line of ar- 
gument, William Samuelson and Richard J. 
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Zeckhauser (1988) term such behavior a 
"status quo bias." 
Policies based on the synthetic character 
of chemicals embody these kinds of influ- 
ences. Chemicals that generate hazardous 
exposures because they are a natural part of 
our environment are much more readily ac- 
cepted than those that are synthetic. One 
possible explanation is that there is an im- 
plicit judgment on the part of the public 
and by government agencies that the cost 
of eliminating natural carcinogens is much 
greater than the costs associated with avoid- 
ing synthetic chemicals. However, such ex- 
planations do not appear to be fully persua- 
sive. For example, the government can 
certainly ban peanut butter so that we could 
avoid aflatoxin exposures if we were truly 
concerned with risk levels since the major 
cost would be forgoing use of this hazardous 
product rather than threatening the well- 
being of the U.S. economy. Moreover, to 
the extent that the official regulatory biases 
have been embodied in legislation or agency 
directives, it is the specific synthetic charac- 
ter of the chemical that is the pertinent 
regulatory concern, rather than its linkage 
to cost-risk trade-offs or other factors that 
might be of greater concern to economists. 
These findings suggest that consumers 
participating in hypothetical experiments 
and students who have responded to the 
various laboratory experiments are not alone 
in their overreaction to increases in the 
accustomed risk level. The federal govern- 
ment appears to have institutionalized these 
biases in the course of developing its regula- 
tion of synthetic chemicals. Whereas the 
appropriate task of the government is to 
alleviate market failures, in this instance its 
principal function has been to institutional- 
ize them. 
